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The rules of professional conduct in most states require attorneys to enter into
written agreements with their clients when contracting on a contingent fee basis.2
In so doing, the parties define the existence and limits of their attorney-client
relationship. In the present case, an attorney and his client agreed to a ten
percent contingent fee; however, the lawyer transferred to a new firm prior to the
conclusion of the case.4 Subsequently, the client signed a new, identical
agreement provided by the attorney's new firm.5 In the contract, the attorney
used the previously agreed-upon fee percentage instead of the standard office rate
used by the attorney's new firm.6 After the case settled, the senior partner in the
attorney's new firm withheld the settlement from the client and brought suit
demanding a larger contingent fee.7 The trial court, relying on a state statute
allowing contract disputes of under $15,000 to be referred to a fact-finder, did just
that.8
The trial court adhered to the fact-finder's conclusions and granted
judgment for the client on his counterclaim.9 On appeal, the plaintiff
characterized his action as sounding in tort and alleged that it was improperly
referred to the fact-finder."0 The appellate court held that the case was properly
referred to the fact-finder, and that the plaintiff had wrongfully withheld the
settlement from the client."
1. 613 A.2d 1336 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
2. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.5(c) (1991) (stating that
contingent fee agreements must be in writing).
3. See generally MODEL RULES OF PR OFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1991) (defining the
attorney-client relationship).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On July 4, 1986, defendant Michael Goepfert entered into an oral contract for
professional services with his friend Neil Johnson, an attorney. 2 Johnson agreed
to handle Goepfert's personal injury claim against the town of Tolland on a ten
percent contingency fee basis. 3 At that time, Johnson was an associate in the
law firm of Teitenberg and Wallace.14 In December of 1986, Johnson left
Teitenberg and Wallace and began working for the plaintiff's firm." Following
the transfer, Johnson and Goepfert signed a standard-form professional services
agreement provided by the plaintiff's new firm.'6 On the form, Johnson
modified the standard fee by crossing out the thirty-three and one-third percent
figure used by his firm and replacing it with the ten percent figure previously
agreed upon in July.
17
In August of 1987, Goepfert's personal injury claim with the town was
settled for $34,000.8 Johnson recommended the settlement to Goepfert, and
plaintiff Beizer of Johnson's law firm approved.' 9 After the settlement, Beizer
demanded payment of thirty-three and one-third percent of the recovery from
Goepfert. Goepfert would only pay ten percent.2' Beizer withheld the standard
fee from the settlement and brought the instant action on August 18, 1988,
alleging breach of contract and recovery in quantum meruit.21 The plaintiff
amended his complaint on December 30, 1988, adding Johnson as a party
defendant. In so doing, Beizer claimed that Johnson had altered the contingency
fee agreement without authority.22
Beizer commenced a second action in July of 1989 alleging that: (1) the
defendants conspired to defraud the plaintiff; (2) Johnson breached his
employment contract; and (3) Johnson tortiously interfered with the contractual
relationship between the plaintiff and Goepfert.23  Goepfert then filed a
counterclaim against Beizer, alleging breach of contract and wrongful refusal to
pay under the professional services contract.24
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On February 27, 1989, Beizer signed the first action on the trial list as a
nonjury matter.25 On November 20, 1990, he signed the second action on the
trial list as a jury matter.26 However, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
followed the required procedure or paid the required statutory jury fee necessary
to have any of the claims heard by a jury. Consequently, the cases were never
placed on the jury docket.8 In February of 1990, the trial court granted the
plaintiff's motion to consolidate his two claims.2 9 In accordance with state law,
the court referred the dispute to an attorney fact-finder prior to trial and neither
party objected."0
The attorney fact-finder determined that the plaintiff had failed to meet his
burden of proof in both actions and on all claims. As a result, the fact-finder
recommended to the court that judgment be granted in favor of the defendant as
to plaintiff's claims and that judgment be granted in favor of the defendant on his
counterclaim for breach of contract and wrongful withholding of the settlement.3'
The trial court overruled plaintiff's subsequent objections to the fact-finder's
determinations.32 The court followed the recommendations of the attorney fact-
finder and entered judgment in favor of the defendant on the counterclaim in the
amount of $7933, plus the costs of the counterclaim 3 3 The plaintiff appealed the
judgment3 4 On appeal, it was held that the case was properly referred to the
fact-finder, that the findings were not clearly erroneous, and that the plaintiff








30. Id. at 1338-39.




35. Id at 1341, 1343, 1344.
36. Id at 1344.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Referral to Fact-finders
In Connecticut, parties in civil cases are entitled to have their cases heard by
a jury." However, when a jury trial is not requested, or when requested in
improper fashion, the parties will have their case heard by a judge acting as the
finder of fact." Connecticut state law provides that judges may refer certain
pending cases to "[q]ualified members of the bar to sit as adjuncts to the trial
bench in nonjury cases for the purpose of accelerating the disposition of cases."39
Referring disputes to an attorney fact-finder increases efficiency, saves time, and,
most often, produces equitable results. 40 However, parties may object to the
referral before the fact-finder hears the case.4'
According to the legal history of the Connecticut statute authorizing referral
of such cases to fact-finders, the statute is intended "[tlo establish, in an effort to
reduce the pending civil caseload, a system of fact-finders for certain non-jury
cases and a system of arbitration for jury cases.... .,42 The final form of the
Connecticut statute reads as follows:
[Jiudges of the superior court may make such rules as they deem
necessary to provide a procedure in accordance with which the court, in
its discretion, may refer to a fact-finder ... any contract action.., in
which only money damages are claimed and which is based upon an
express or implied promise to pay a definite sun, and in which the
amount... is less that fifteen thousand dollars.... Such cases may be
referred to a fact-finder only after the pleadings have been closed, a trial
list claim has been filed, no claim for a jury trial has been filed at the
time of reference, and the time prescribed in section 52-215 ... has
expired.
43
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; CONN. CONST. art. L, § 19.
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-549(n) (1983) (contract claims referred to fact-finder); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-215 (1983) (docketing of jury and court cases).
39. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-549(n) (1983).
40. See generally Rostenberg-Doem Co. v. Weiner, 552 A.2d 827 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
41. The Connecticut Supreme Court identified a strong public policy behind requiring parties to
object before the fact-finder's determination; such policy discourages litigants from reserving their
objections to attack an unfavorable outcome. Bowman v. 1477 Central Ave. Apartments, 524 A.2d
610, 613 (Conn. 1987).
42. Beizer, 613 A.2d at 1339-40 (citing 25 H.RPROc., Pt 24, 1982 Sess., p. 7665, remarks of
Rep. Richard D. Tulisano).
43. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-549(n) (1983) (emphasis added). According to § 52-215, the jury
trial claim must be filed within thirty days of the return day or within ten days after joining an
additional issue of fact. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-215 (1983).
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A similar statute, Section 52-434(a)(4), authorizes the referral to referees of
a broader assortment of disputes involving greater monetary values.44 Attorneys
appointed as fact-finders under Section 52-549 possess less authority.45 The
Connecticut Appellate Court has stated, "[wihile the two referral programs differ
in name, source of appointment and scope of authority, under both programs the
referees 'share the same function of fact-finders whose determination of the facts
is reviewable in accordance with well-establishedprocedures prior to the rendition
of judgment by the court.' 46 Under either program, there is no authority for the
fact-finder to render judgments. Because the attorney referee has no power to
render a judgment, he is simply a fact-finder.4
B. Objections to the Referral Programs
Objections to the programs authorized under Connecticut law for the referral
of disputes to attorney fact-finders and referees include: (1) that it violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the analogous "remedy by due course of law" provision of the Connecticut
Constitution;49 (2) that the delegation by the Connecticut legislature of the
authority to refer disputes to fact-finders is improper and violates the Connecticut
Constitution, thus depriving the trial courts of subject-matterjurisdiction necessary
to render judgments on the finding of facts;5" and (3) that the standards for
selecting fact-finders are vague, ambiguous, and insufficient.
When faced with these objections, the courts of Connecticut and other
jurisdictions have analyzed and rejected them.52 Because the statutes authorize
trial courts to make referrals to the fact-finder or referee with the consent of the
parties, the due process challenge to the statutes has consistently failed.53 The
Connecticut Supreme Court stated in Seal Audio, Inc. v. Bozak, Inc. that the court
was:
44. Rostenberg-Doen, 552 A.2d at 830 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-434(aX4)).
45. Id.
46. Id (quoting E.L Constr., Inc. v. Scinto, 530 A.2d 1081, 1083 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987)).
47. Health Planning Assocs., Inc. v. Whitlock, 529 A 2d 1352, 1354 (Conn. App. Ct 1987).
48. Seal Audio, Inc. v. Bozak, Inc., 508 A.2d 415, 421 (Conn. 1986).
49. Id at 417.
50. Health Planning Assocs., 529 A.2d at 1353.
51. Id
52. Regarding both the aforementioned constitutional challenges, the United States Supreme
Court has rejected a claim that federal due process protection requires a trial judge to hear personally
the testimony of witnesses in order to determine contested factual issues relating to the admissibility
of incriminating statements of a defendant in a criminal case. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667, 677 (1980).
53. SealAudio, 508 A.2d at 425. The widespread use of magistrates in the federal courts to fimd
facts and recommend decisions has been upheld in the rare instances where it has been claimed to
violate due process. See Mathews v. Wever, 423 U.S. 261, 269 n.5 (1976); Coolidge v. Schooner
California, 637 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981).
1993]
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[N]ot aware of any authority . .. that even arguably supports the
proposition that reference of a nonjury civil case to a nonjudicial agency
to find facts and make recommendations on legal questions violates the
right to due process of law so long as these determinations can be
adequately reviewed in a judicial forum under procedures similar to
those provided by [Connecticut's] rules of practice."
As for the subject-matter jurisdictional challenge, Connecticut courts have held
that when the cases fit within the statutory framework, and the fact-finder is
properly selected, the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction to render
judgment on the fact-finder's determinations.55 Regarding the challenge that the
standards for selecting fact-finders are vague and insufficient, the Connecticut
Appellate Court stated, "The statute and the rules governing fact-finders provide
... adequate standards and safeguards."56
C. Contract Claims Covered by § 52-549
Before the instant case, Connecticut courts had not decided precisely what
constituted a contract claim under Section 52-549. However, in J. Dunn & Sons,
Inc. v. Paragon Homes of New England," the New Hampshire Supreme Court
set out the considerations for determining the nature of a claim. The Connecticut
Court of Appeals thereafter adopted these considerations in the instant case.5
In J. Dunn & Sons, the court examined whether the pleadings sounded in contract
in order to decide if an arbitration clause applied to the dispute at hand. The court
presented the following considerations for determining the classification of a
claim: "The source or origin of the duty alleged to have been violated; the nature
of the grievance; the character of the remedy such facts indicate; [and] the type
of damages sought. . . ." The court adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
position that "[t]he purpose of the contract duty is to secure the receipt of the
thing bargained for, while the tort duty which results from the contract relation of
the parties is that a party must refrain from conducting itself so as to cause a
particular harm to the other party. "6
Disputes regarding professional services contracts and claims in quantum
meruit are contract-based claims, while those regarding the wrongful withholding
of money due under a contract are tort-based.61 Tortious interference involves
54. Seal Audio, 508 A.2d at 423.
55. Health Planning, 529 A.2d at 1354 (held that the delegation of authority to the judges of
the Superior Court to establish the fact-finder program did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights).
56. Id
57. 265 A.2d 5 (N.H. 1970).
58. See Beizer, 613 A.2d at 1339.
59. J. Dunn & Sons, 265 A.2d at 7 (citing 1 AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 8 (1962)).
60. Id. at 8 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 4 cmt. c (1965)).
61. See generally J. Dunn & Sons, 265 A.2d at 7-8.
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an underlying contract. Its elements include "a contractual or beneficial
relationship, the defendants' knowledge of that relationship, the intent to interfere
with it, and the consequent actual loss suffered by the plaintiff "62
D. Standard of Review for Fact-finder's Decision
After an appointed fact-finder decides the facts, an aggrieved party has a
statutory outlet for review. CONNEcTIcuT PRACTICE BOOK § 546H provides:
[a] party may file objections to the acceptance of a finding of facts on
the ground that conclusions of fact stated in it were not properly
reached on the basis of the subordinate facts found, or that the fact-
finder erred in rulings on evidence or in other rulings, or that there are
other reasons why the finding of facts should not be accepted.
Objections must be filed within fourteen days after the filing of the
finding of facts.
63
When an aggrieved party requests the trial court to substitute its own findings of
fact for those of the fact-finder, the trial court must determine whether or not the
objectionable findings were "clearly erroneous."" In a contract action, findings
of fact should be overturned only when they are clearly erroneous.65
IV. THE INSTANT DECIsION
The Beizer court found that the requirements of the statute66 authorizing the
referral of "any contract action" to an attorney fact-finder were satisfied in the
instant case.67 The court reasoned that the statute granted the court subject-
matter jurisdiction to refer the dispute to the attorney referee.' The statute
authorizes the referral of "any contract action" to the referee. 69 Although the
Beizer court noted that "[tihe meaning of 'any contract action' as used in this
statute is not specifically defined,"7 the court held that because the statute did
not use the words "only contract actions," the plain meaning of the statute vested
62. Hart, Nininger & Campbell Assocs., Inc. v. Rogers, 548 A.2d 758, 764 (Conn. App. CL
1988).
63. Shaw v. L.A. Socci, Inc., 587 A.2d 429, 432 n.9 (Conn. App. Ct 1991) (citing CONN. PRAc.
BOOK § 546H).
64. Id. at 432.
65. Wilcox Trucking, Inc. v. Mansour Builders, Inc,, 567 A.2d 1250, 1252 (Conn. App. CL
1989), cert. for appeal denied, 573 A.2d 318 (Conn. 1990).
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-549(n) (1983).
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the court with the power to refer a dispute sounding mostly in contract, but also
in tort. 7' It held that the "statute does not necessarily exclude cases with a
mixture of claims based in contract and tort.'7 2 For these reasons, the court held
that the statutory requirements of Section 52-549 were met and the referral was
proper.
73
. The court found the disputes in the instant case to be "contract actions" for
purposes of the statute.7 4 The plaintiff's claims arose from both the professional
services contract signedby Johnson and Goepfert, and from Johnson's employment
contract with the plaintiff.7  Johnson sought damages in the amount of the
difference between the standard contingent fee, thirty-three and one-third percent,
and the altered ten percent figure.7 6  The court adopted the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) position that "[t]he purpose of the contract duty is to secure the receipt
of the thing bargained for."7  The court found all of the claims involved to
be generally contractual in nature under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) test.79 The
court restated its holding in McKeever v. Von Reiters° that the coding of an
action does not determine the basis or classification of the claim for purposes of
Section 52-549(n).8 '
Although the plaintiff contended that the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction based on failure to satisfy the statutory language, Beizer also claimed
that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because he had claimed the
case for a jury trial.' In response, the appellate court noted Beizer's numerous
failures to follow statutory procedure in requesting a jury trial.' The court stated
that procedural requirements in obtaining a jury trial do not violate the
Connecticut constitutional right to a trial by jury.' First, the court noted that
Beizer failed to fie a jury-docket claim slip required by Section 52-215."
71. Id at 1339-40.
72. Id at 1340.
73. Id at 1339.




78. Beizer's claims included: (1) one against Johnson for breach of employment contract, tortious
interference with a contract relationship, and conspiracy to defraud; and (2) one against Goepfert for
breach of professional services contract, conspiracy to defraud, and for recovery in quantum meruit.
Goepfert counterclaimed for breach of professional services contract Id. at 1340-41.
79. Id at 1340.
80. 544 A.2d 242, 243 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that an action seeking to recover for
damage to an automobile engine allegedly caused by work improperly performed was a negligence
action and could not be referred to a fact-finder under § 52-549).
81. Beizer, 613 A.2d at 1341.
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id at 1342 (citing Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bishop, Kirk & Saunders, Inc., 535 A.2d 387
(Conn. App. Ct. 1988)).
85. Id at 1341.
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Second, the court noted that Beizer never paid the $100 jury fee required by
Section 52-258.' The court held that Beizer's claim slip for the trial list, which
was filed on November 20, 1990, and which indicated that the second action was
a jury matter, did not satisfy the statutory requirements.' It ultimately held that
the referral of the consolidated cases did not implicate the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the trial court and was properly referred under Section 52-
549(n).8
Next, the court discussed the plaintiff's claim that the findings of the attorney
referee were clearly erroneous.89 The plaintiff claimed that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conclusions of the fact-finder. 0  Noting that great
deference is generally given to the fact-finder, 91 the Connecticut Court of Appeals
held that the factual findings, as adopted by the trial court, were not clearly
erroneous.
92
Lastly, the court held that there is no rule of law requiring the trial court to
have the transcripts of the hearing with the fact-finder before rendering
judgment. 3 Curiously, the transcripts were in the possession of the plaintiff.94
Chastising the plaintiff, the appellate court stated, "[if the plaintiff felt that
transcripts were crucial to his objections [to the findings of the referee], he should
have submitted them to the trial court."'95 Thus, the appellate court concluded
that the trial court properly rendered judgment in the instant case and the trial
court's judgment was affirmed.96
V. COMMENT
For the most part, the Connecticut system of referring certain classes of
disputes to attorney fact-finders has achieved its goal of removing cases from the
jury docket. At the same time, it has reached fair and equitable results similar to
those of juries which would have decided the facts in these matters. If it seems
that the novelty of the fact-finder system, coupled with the fact that it is relatively
untested nationwide, might deprive a party of a "fair shake," one must remember
that parties who choose to have their dispute heard by the fact-finder are protected




89. Id at 1341-43.
90. Id at 1342.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1343.
93. Id
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referral by filing a claim slip for a jury trial;' they can object to the findings of
the fact-finder and suggest that the trial judge disregard them if they are clearly
erroneous;9 and of course, the parties have the normal avenues of relief through
the appellate process.
It would seem that the only failures of the system are in the eyes of those
parties and attorneys who are not able to succeed on the merits of their case in
front of the fact-finder. In the instant case, for example, Beizer failed to object
to the referral, he failed to file a jury claim slip for his consolidated actions, and
he failed to make a case in front of the fact-finder. For these reasons, Beizer
probably would have preferred a jury trial. But would there have been a different
result? Probably not. Surprisingly, with the number of cases referred to fact-
finders each year, few appellants succeed in challenging the findings of the
attorney fact-finder as clearly erroneous." This would seem to suggest that there
is an element of reliability in the Connecticut referral plan.
It is interesting to note that besides Connecticut, no other state in the country
has instituted an alternative dispute resolution framework involving attorney fact-
finders. It would seem that based on the successes and failures of the Connecticut
system, and the ever-increasing backlog of cases in state courts, other states may
begin to examine the Connecticut system for application in their own court
systems in the near future.
The fact-finder program might be compared to the federal Magistrate system
instituted in 1968 as part of a Congressional court-reform package."t° The
Magistrate system has, in part, relieved some of the congestion in the
overburdened federal system. And while the magistrates originally were only
empowered to preside over preliminary hearings and issue warrants; today, with
the consent of the parties (as in Connecticut), the magistrates can render final
judgments."' If the Connecticut fact-finder program works as well as the
Magistrate system, perhaps many states in the future will choose to adopt similar
systems, thus expanding and improving on past successes while learning from the
failures that time will expose in such programs.
CRAIG R. HEIDEMANN
97. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-215 (1983).
98. Cashman v. Calvo, 493 A.2d 891, 894-95 (Conn. 1985).
99. See, e.g., Roslenberg-Doern, 552 A.2d at 833-34 (affirming the findings of the trial court,
which accepted the findings of the attorney referee); Seal Audio, 508 A.2d at 426-27 (declining to
review as "plain error" the failure to obtain the consent of the parties under the existing conditions of
implied consent).
100. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1988).
101. Id. § 636(c)(1).
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